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Abstract
In this article, Mongolian economic performance during its major transition 
period is compared with the economic performance of Central Asian transition 
countries. In particular, the following key areas are examined: output 
performance, privatization and liberalization policies, foreign direct investment, 
infl ation, poverty, problems of economic management, foreign trade, and 
exchange rate policies. The results of the study show that Mongolia became a 
rapid reformer and has been fairly successful over its transition despite starting 
with economic crises. The comparative study with Central Asian transition 
countries demonstrate that Mongolia compares favorably with most of the 
Commonwealth Independent State (CIS) countries. Despite external shocks 
and some less than successful policy implementations, infl ation slowed, output 
declined less sharply, and the fi rst positive growth in GDP was made.
Keywords: Central Asia, Mongolia, reform policy, transition economy.
Introduction
Most of the former planned economies have undertaken economic reforms aimed at 
replacing central planning with a market economy. There is not, of course, a single 
process of transition, a process that has affected the lives of approximately one-third 
of the world population (Nolan 1995). Neither the People’s Republic of China nor 
Vietnam have formally renounced their socialist development objectives, but in most of 
the transitional economies, including Mongolia, the aim has been to achieve as rapidly 
as possible economic, political, social, and institutional change, largely rejecting the 
old economy and its institutions and attempting to replace them with some notions of a 
market economy.
The transition process in global terms is dominated by China and Russia. The start 
of economic reform in China is usually dated from December 1978, although reforms 
began immediately after the death of Mao Zedong. Remarkable measures taken in the 
PRC included the dissolution of agricultural communes and the development of township 
and village industries outside the web of offi cial price controls and state planning. Output 
grew rapidly, and infl ationary pressures were negligible for the fi rst few years (Rana and 
Naved 1995). In Russia, Mikhail Gorbachev fi rst outlined glasnost (openness) as a policy 
in 1986. In the same year, Vietnam also initiated policies of doi moi (innovation), although 
real change did not begin until 1989, and the Lao PDR adopted gradualist reform programs 
in 1986. By 1989, the transition from central planning to a greater market orientation 
had became a political imperative throughout Eastern Europe and the then USSR. 
Mongolia moved to a multiparty political system in 1990 with equally rapid political, 
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constitutional, and economic changes. The countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – emerged as independent states 
from the disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991, and since their independence 
these countries have been striving to carry out market and political reforms.
A great lesson has been learnt from these various experiences of transition, and 
the relevant literature is dominated by the argument that economic reforms should be 
comprehensive, rapid, consistent, and sustained. However, there are many economists 
who criticize this idea. Nolan (1995) discusses in great detail the transition experiences 
of China and Russia, pointing to the different outcomes of the transition in terms of its 
impact on economic growth, infl ation, and socioeconomic indicators. Controversy thus 
remains as to how the process of transition should be managed, its speed, and the role of 
the state in that process.
As observed by Cukrowski (2006): “The economies of Mongolia, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were centrally planned during the 
Soviet era and followed development strategies determined in Moscow.” Despite some 
similarities of economic structure, these countries have pursued different development 
strategies since the early 1990s, when the fi rst multiparty election was held and a coalition 
government was established in Mongolia, and when the other Central Asian countries 
gained their independence.
In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, all six countries were subject to several 
external shocks: an aid shock, a trade shock, and a macroeconomic management shock. 
Soviet aid was reduced considerably in 1989 and then terminated in 1991. It is estimated 
that the aid shock was equivalent to around 30%–35% of GNP of these countries. Entire 
investment programs were fi nanced by the Soviet Union in the form of loans, and there 
was small but regular investment by the state in these countries. The collapse of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) delivered a trade shock to all of these 
countries. They suddenly lost much of their trade, particularly their export markets, and 
the sharp fall caused severe foreign exchange constraints. In addition to these diffi culties, 
there was also the macroeconomic management shock created by the return of experienced 
senior technical advisers to the Soviet Union. The management of state expenditure in 
investment and production suddenly became more diffi cult without experienced advisors 
in the new economic system (Griffi n 1995: 14).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the transition to the market economy did not proceed 
smoothly. Diverse economic strategies were adopted by national governments and 
economists, despite the similarities of traditional political and economical structures. 
Mongolia began its rapid reform programs under the leadership of the Communist Party, 
and adopted a big-bang strategy of rapid transformation of property rights, accompanied 
by administrative controls and price liberalization (Pomfret 2000). Kyrgyzstan took advice 
from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which advocated rapid 
changes and the rapid launching of reform programs in the region. Turkmenistan was at 
the opposite end of the spectrum, as the president personalized absolute authority and 
limited economic change. Kazakhstan initially appeared to follow a liberal path, but the 
government took an important role once again. Uzbekistan retained a tightly controlled 
political system, and has been slow in undertaking economic reforms. Tajikistan 
experienced civil war in 1991–92 and 1996–97, and delayed the implementation of the 
political and economic reforms (Pomfret and Anderson 2003: 75).
This article covers Mongolia and the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. As these countries are at different 
stages in their transition from central planning, their experiences provide useful material 
for comparative analysis. The fi rst objective is to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
transition process in Mongolia and the Central Asian countries, identifying and comparing 
the initial conditions and the major reform measures adopted. The second objective is to 
conduct a comparative analysis of the performance of these economies with regard to 
developments in key macroeconomic variables. The fi nal aim is to identify similarities 
and differences in the transition processes in these countries, and the lessons that can be 
learned.
Initial Conditions and Reform Programs
Democratic Mongolia and the newly independent countries in Central Asia started from 
fairly similar initial conditions. Before the transition in Mongolia, there had been some 
modest reforms intended to create a new economic system; however, these reforms 
were unsuccessful. In the Soviet Union, some reform programs had taken place in 
Baltic republics under Gorbachev’s supervision; however, these reforms were absent in 
Central Asia. In order to create the fundamental conditions for a market system, these six 
transitional Asian countries had to overcome various serious distortions that they inherited 
from the command economy under the Soviet Union. It should be noted, however, that 
the inheritance from the Soviet Union also included several positive points:
● the presence of many pivotal branches of industry and agriculture;
● a rather well-developed economic and social infrastructure;
● positive social indicators (Table 1), including high levels of elementary, secondary, 
and tertiary education among the population, limited inequality in the distribution 
of income among various groups within the population, a low rate of infant 
mortality compared with other developing countries, and high life expectancy.
Table 1. Initial conditions in 1990: Selected social indicators
Country
Primary 
school 
enrollment 
(gross)
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years)
Infant 
mortality 
rate per 
1000 live 
births
Adult 
literacy 
rate (% 
of people 
aged 
15 and 
above)
PPP 
GDP per 
capita 
USD
Mongolia 90 63 55.5 94.24 1331
Kazakhstan 89 68 63.0 97.53 4650
Kyrgyzstan 92 68 58.0 96.71 2038
Tajikistan 77 63 91.0 97.67 2002
Turkmenistan 82 63 80.0 98.96 4405
Uzbekistan 78 64 57.0 96.22 1499
Least developed 
countries 63.7 45.6 121.0 52.4 1053
Source: “Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human 
Development”: United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2000; “Human 
Development Report for Mongolia: Reorienting the State”: UNDP 2000.
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Despite these positive elements inherited from the Soviet Union, there were also certain 
problems such as structural distortion in the development and distribution of various 
levels of production and an ineffi cient system of economic management. Therefore, all 
these countries had to begin the fundamental restructuring of their national economies. As 
they undertook these programs, they also faced similar conditions:
● A high degree of emphasis on raw materials production. On the one hand, the 
roles of Mongolia and the Central Asian republics in the Soviet system were 
those of producers and suppliers of raw materials to the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, they were signifi cant markets for the sale of fi nished goods from 
Russia and the Baltic republics. Like Mongolia, all the Central Asian countries 
produced semi-fi nished goods or performed only part of the production cycle. 
Thus, the economies of these transition countries did not develop as integrated, 
self-contained complexes. As a result, output from Central Asian industries that 
produced fi nished goods accounted for only a small portion of total production. In 
addition, production of goods that could compete in the international market was 
nonexistent. For instance, the Mongolian economy was dominated by the livestock 
and minerals sectors. Its role was to export meat, gold, and copper to the Soviet 
Union. Kazakhstan relied on exports of grain, minerals, and energy resources, 
while Uzbekistan was a cotton producer. Unlike Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where 
exploitable resources are rare, Turkmenistan experienced a boom in natural gas 
production just before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
● A high level of dependence on food imports (with the exception of Kazakhstan) 
and consumer goods. All of these countries imported their essential food products 
and consumer goods from the Soviet Union.
● A high level of dependence on state investment policies. Almost 100% of all 
investments in these countries were fi nanced in the form of Soviet Union aid or 
loans. Generally, only investment projects approved by Moscow were fi nanced.
The most industrially developed of these countries was Kazakhstan. Mongolia, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan differed from Kazakhstan in two ways. First, 
these countries had the lowest standards of living among the former Soviet republics 
and satellites. In particular, their per capita incomes amounted to just half of the average 
in the other Soviet Union republics. According to offi cial data, in 1989 approximately 
40%–45% of the families in these countries lived below the poverty line, with incomes 
below the minimum wage (de Mello et al. 1997). Second, these countries suffered from 
an acute unemployment problem, especially in rural areas, although offi cial statistics did 
not provide information on unemployment and poverty within the USSR and socialist 
Mongolia. The offi cial position was that full employment existed in these countries and 
that therefore poverty was impossible (Pomfret 1995: 61). In demographic terms, more 
than half of the population consists of children, students, and pensioners. Moreover, the 
majority of the population in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan is 
Muslim; they have their own way of life, communal forms of organization, and a low 
propensity for migration. As Table 2 indicates, the share of industry in these countries 
was lower than average, compared with other USSR, Eastern European, and East Asian 
countries. The highest rate of industrialization occurred in Mongolia, which was equal to 
the average of the CIS countries. In the beginning of the transition, the degree of openness 
of the economy was weak, which can be shown by the liberalization index. Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, and the former Soviet 
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Central Asian republics, experienced a longer period of around 70 years, under central 
planning compared with other transition countries.
Table 2. Initial conditions: Selected indicators
Country
Share of 
industry in 
GDP
Liberalization 
index
Years 
under 
central 
planning
PPP 
Income 
per 
capita 
USD
CMEA 
trade % 
of GDP
1990 1989 1989 1990
Mongolia 0.41 0.04 70 2100 31
Kazakhstan 0.34 0.04 71 5130 20.8
Kyrgyzstan 0.4 0.04 71 3180 27.7
Tajikistan 0.34 0.04 71 3610 31
Turkmenistan 0.34 0.04 71 4230 33
Uzbekistan 0.33 0.04 71 2740 25.5
USSR 0.41 0.04 70 4755 27.2
Baltic countries 0.45 0.05 51 7973 35.9
East Europe 0.52 0.16 43 6547 8.3
East Asia 0.36 0.5 19 882 4.1
Source: Transition Report 2000: Employment, Skills and Transition, EBRD, 2000
In evaluating the process of economic reform, it is essential to take into account these 
special characteristics and the problems that each country faced. At the same time, it 
should be noted that some of the features inherited from the Soviet Union also provided 
advantages for these countries. For instance, the raw materials focus of these transition 
countries in Asia provided advantages in the period when these economies were no longer 
closed. It was easier for countries producing raw materials to move from the CIS market 
to the world market. The estimated impact of moving from Soviet to world prices indicate 
large gains for Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, due to the fact that 
their natural resources such as gold, copper, gas, and oil were severely undervalued at 
Soviet prices, and also due to a rise in world prices for metals and cotton (Rumer 1996).
Alternative Approaches to Economic Reform
Mongolia and the Central Asian transition countries followed quite different strategies for 
the transition to a market economy, despite their similar initial conditions. Some moved 
more rapidly than others, and some had more coherent policies than others. In Mongolia, 
the reform programs were initiated by the government, which stayed in offi ce until 1990. 
The economic reforms were motivated by the political and economic changes taking 
place in the Soviet Union during the mid-1980s, the growing realization that the USSR 
itself was facing serious economic diffi culties and might not be in a position to help 
Mongolia, and the increasing domestic criticism that the centrally planned model received. 
The recognition of Mongolia by the United States in 1989 and the wide acceptance 
of the concepts of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost improved the international 
environment for economic reforms (Asian Development Bank (ADB) 1992: 80–81).
In contrast, the Central Asian republics did not actively participate in serious 
discussions of different models of reform in the other parts of the Soviet Union. They 
oriented themselves toward greater economic integration with Russia, and hence were 
not fully prepared for economic independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
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That all changed in 1993, when the Central Asian transition countries were suddenly 
excluded from the ruble zone of the Russian Federation (Pomfret and Anderson 2003: 
11). This exclusion, together with political independence, forced governments in this 
region to develop radical programs to stabilize their economies and to elaborate their own 
programs of reform and development.
In Mongolia, reforms in the period 1986–89 that were intended to create a new 
economic system had to wait until the introduction of a new political regime. After July 
1990, when the coalition government was established after the fi rst multiparty elections, 
the government moved rapidly in a wide range of areas with a view of converting the 
economy to a market economy. The transition strategy followed by Mongolia and many 
other transition countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS is known as the “big bang,” or 
shock therapy approach. The main focus of the Government’s economic reform program 
was the privatization of state-owned assets. Price liberalization was a second important 
element in transition. Selected retail prices were freed, a private banking system was 
created, and the national currency, the tugrik, was devalued. The result was rapid infl ation, 
and the government was forced to increase wages and pensions. In the mid-1990s, an 
improvement in economic performance occurred; starting from 1994, GDP began to 
show positive rates of growth, and by 2000–01 real GDP had recovered to the level prior 
to the transition.
Kazakhstan fi rst embarked on a transitional path of shock therapy, but later 
attempted to defi ne its own special path. In particular, it tried to follow the development 
strategies adopted earlier by South Korea and Japan. As a result, in 1995–96, when the 
government made some corrections to its economic policy, state intervention in certain 
spheres of the economy increased. Although the country did get things underway quite 
swiftly with price liberalization and enterprise reform (Pomfret 2001). Unfortunately, 
policies promoting the privatization of energy and mineral rights were associated with 
widespread corruption. In 1996, Kazakhstan accepted currency convertibility on its 
current account, and prices since then have been determined by the market, and have 
been subject to world market forces (Pomfret 2001).
Kyrgyzstan initially delayed its economic reforms, but later adopted a policy of 
implementing the recommendations of the World Bank and the IMF, in other words, a 
policy close to “shock therapy”. In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan was the fi rst country that 
managed to reduce hyperinfl ation, lowering the annual infl ation rate to below 50% in 
1995, a year earlier than Kazakhstan (Pomfret 2001). Complete price liberalization was 
achieved in 1994. Enterprise restructuring reform was more extensive than in any other 
Central Asian transition economy (Pomfret 1998). As noted by Gleason, the fi nancial 
sector was also transformed, so that both the exchange rate and interest rates are market 
determined, although the fi nancial market has limited allocative effi ciency (Gleason 
2003: 75–78). As noted by Pomfret (2001: 4): “In 1998, Kyrgyzstan became the fi rst 
Soviet successor state to join the World Trade Organization, refl ecting the country’s 
liberal trade regime. Progress in creating the institutions needed to support a functioning 
market economy was, however, controversial. Important markets like those in foreign 
exchange, labor, and domestic capital did not function effectively.” This may refl ect not 
only economic conditions but also other factors such as shortage of human capital. Since 
independence, many of the educated Kyrgyz have emigrated to the developed countries.
Uzbekistan’s economy is recognized as one of the least liberalized economies 
in the transition from central planning (Pomfret 2000). “Although the political regime 
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is illiberal, the economy has been gradually reformed since independence. Price and 
enterprise reform proceeded slowly but by 1996 practically all prices had been liberalized 
along with housing and small state enterprises” (Pomfret 2001: 5). Trade policy was 
liberalized after export taxes were removed. Macroeconomic control was achieved 
slower than in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the annual infl ation rate only dropping below 
50% in 1998. As noted by Pomfret (2001), compared with other countries, prices have 
been less free than in the other countries, and privatization has progressed more slowly. 
However, by 1998, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
ranked Uzbekistan ahead of Kazakhstan in its annual index of cumulative progress 
towards establishing a market economy. Uzbekistan’s government has, however, shown a 
willingness to reassess and change economic policies when faced with evidence that they 
are not working well, and in 2000–01 there were signs of increased support for private 
sector activities and liberalization of exchange controls (Pomfret 2000: 45).
Turkmenistan is classifi ed as a slow reformer. The president made it clear that 
he wanted to transform Turkmenistan into the “Kuwait of Kara Kum.” Moreover, his 
economic interests were oriented towards the West and East Asia, rather than towards 
Russia and the other countries of Central Asia. Initially, the president promised a variety 
of free utilities and services, the costs of which were to be covered for by natural gas 
export revenues (Pomfret 2001). However, the gas pipelines channeled gas only to former 
Soviet republics, and allowed little opportunity for market diversifi cation. Due to a poor 
cotton harvest in 1996, Turkmenistan’s GDP declined sharply, and as a result the country 
moved to more serious reforms (Pomfret 1999). The cost of daily consumer goods, for 
example meat, vegetable oil, tea, and sugar, were freed over time, and price subsidies 
were withdrawn (Pomfret 1999). Despite the promises of the president, there was still 
little evidence of change in the economic and social conditions in Turkmenistan (Gleason 
2003: 105–108). In 1999, when the president declared himself President for Life, the 
EBRD withdrew all public-sector loans, “which underlined the increasing isolation of the 
country” (Pomfret 2001).
Tajikistan is acknowledged to have established itself as a market-based economy, 
but civil war in the 1990s delayed the implementation of consistent economic policies 
(Pomfret 2001). A huge decline in GDP per capita occurred in the fi rst half of 1990s, 
even after the political situation was stabilized and peace negotiated. Investment declined 
due to political instability and the poor security situation, while economic activity was 
stifl ed by lack of unifi ed control because separate agencies wanted to raise taxes and fees 
to increase revenue (Pomfret 2006). In 1995, the parliament adopted a program to guide 
reform through to 2000. This program aimed to liberalize international trade, except for 
that in aluminum, to privatize state assets, and to establish an open economy with favorable 
conditions for foreign investment and the development of export-oriented production.
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Table 3. Selected indicators of transition
Country Year transition 
began
Starting date 
of stabilization 
program
Average 
infl ation 
1989–2005
EBRD 
Average 
Transition 
Indicator 
2005
WTO 
status
Currency 
convertibility
Mongolia 1990 Jul 90 50.4 2.89
Joined 
1997 Yes
Kazakhstan 1992 Jan 94 216.6 2.93 WP 1996 Yes
Kyrgyzstan 1992 May 93 154.8 2.93
Joined 
1998 Yes
Tajikistan 1992 Feb 95 648.2 2.37 WP 2001 Yes
Turkmenistan 1992 187.0 1.3 - No
Uzbekistan 1992 Nov 94 231.1 2.1 WP1994 No
Note: the WTO dates signify the establishment of the Working Party agreements; 
this does not necessarily refl ect the current stage of negotiation. Sources: fi rst 
three columns, IMF 2006; fourth and other columns, EBRD 2005. 
A summary of selected transition indicators or degree of economic liberalization is 
presented in Table 3. The table clearly shows that we can classify these countries into 
two different groups in terms of liberalization: Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan 
belong to the more liberalized group, and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to 
the less liberalized group. Among these countries, Kazakhstan had the greatest degree 
of liberalization and the best quality of institutions, while Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan ranked among the worst-off of all transition countries. WTO status and 
national currency convertibility suggest that Tajikistan has substantial potential for better 
economic performance and transition, but must complete its liberalization and stabilization 
programs in order to reach a level of transition similar to that of Mongolia, Kazakhstan, 
and Kyrgyzstan.
Pomfret (2001) observes: “Economic performance is related to initial conditions 
and other exogenous forces, as well as to policies. Given the preexisting specialization 
in primary products, the national development strategies have been outward-oriented.” 
Despite attempts to protect the domestic market, trade policies have been liberal (Pomfret 
2001). Mongolia has already signed favored-nation agreements with Japan and the 
U.S. to enable exports to these markets at preferential tariff rates. However, Mongolia’s 
access to seaports in the PRC and the former Soviet Union lay mainly through railways. 
The long distances that had to be traveled to reach international markets involved high 
transportation costs and long travel times, which in turn retarded Mongolian exports. 
Similarly, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which had been expected to benefi t from exports 
of natural gas, “found themselves tied to old Soviet pipelines for their oil and gas exports, 
and Turkmenistan had great diffi culty in collecting payment” (Pomfret 2001). Uzbekistan, 
on the other hand, benefi ted from cotton and gold exports that could be transferred and 
sold for hard currency (Jeffries 2001: 355).
Capital fl ows and external assistance have differed between countries. Direct 
foreign investment has gone mostly to Mongolia and Kazakhstan, to the energy and mining 
sectors. Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia also benefi ted from World Bank and IMF assistance, 
while after 1997 Tajikistan became another major benefi ciary of Western aid.
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Regardless of the reform strategy, all countries had to assign the state an active role 
in carrying out reforms and regulating the economy during the transition. In other words, 
all required a strong government capable of supporting political and macroeconomic 
stability. The failure of reform in Russia was only partly due to the application of shock 
therapy (Rumer 2000: 96), and this statement is no less true of Mongolia, Kazakhstan, 
and Kyrgyzstan.
Comparative Macroeconomic Performance
The period of more than ten years since the transition began is long enough for some effects 
of different economic policies and strategies to be visible. Some countries have changed 
their policies, particularly Uzbekistan, where there have been several policy changes 
within their gradualist transition. Other factors such as world prices of primary products 
have also made it diffi cult to assess their economic performance. Finally, the external debt 
of countries like Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan has increased drastically, which 
has called into question the sustainability of recent economic performance. This section 
attempts to identify recent macroeconomic developments in all six countries; in doing 
so, emphasis is given to development in GDP, savings and investment, infl ation, public 
fi nance, foreign trade, and foreign direct investment.
GDP and sectoral growth
The reforms have had a major impact on all of these economies, and all of them experienced 
a plummeting GDP during the fi rst half of the 1990s (Pomfret 2001). Figure 1 indicates 
the contrasting time paths of real GDP in the six transition countries until 2005 (Pomfret 
2001). Compared with other Central Asian transition economies, Mongolia’s adjustment 
process has been relatively smooth. While Mongolia’s output recovery moved more slowly 
than in the transition countries in East Asia, its growth performance during the transition 
was better than those of the Central Asian states, except for Uzbekistan. Between 1990 
and 2001, Mongolia recorded only three years of output decline, compared with fi ve to 
seven years in the Central Asian countries. Real GDP declined signifi cantly during the 
period 1990–1995 in all the CIS economies, including the Central Asian countries.
Among the Central Asian countries, Tajikistan experienced the worst GDP 
performance. The civil war destroyed economic activity until 1996, by which time real 
GDP had fallen by 40% from the level at independence. “With the impacts of the Russian 
crisis and of the civil war fading, the economy gradually benefi ted from greater stability: 
despite two consecutive years of drought in both 2000 and 2001, GDP grew by an estimated 
8.3% in 2000, and 10.2% in 2001, compared with 3.7% in 1999” (UNESCAP 2003).
Kyrgyzstan suffered a real GDP decline of 45% during 1991–1995 due to external 
shocks that it was not well-prepared to face. Its economy grew by 15% in 1995–97, which 
was mainly due to one project, the Kumtor goldmine, which helped real GDP to increase 
during its investment stage. From 1998 to 2005, economic growth was slower than in 
the preceding period, and average annual growth ranged between 4% and 5%. Real GDP 
in all the Central Asian countries except Uzbekistan remained well below pre-transition 
levels. In 2002, it was down 39% in Tajikistan, 28% in Kyrgyzstan, 19% in Kazakhstan 
and 6% in Turkmenistan, compared with 1990 levels. In purchasing power parity terms, 
GDP levels in these countries (and in Uzbekistan) are comparable with African countries 
such as Tanzania and Ghana (Cukrowski 2006).
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Turkmenistan’s decline in real GDP was comparably slow in 1992–93. It accelerated 
in 1994–96, bottomed out in 1997, and then started to recover. At the beginning of the 
2000s, Turkmenistan reported high GDP growth rates of 10%–20%. The reliability of the 
macroeconomic data offi cially reported by Uzbekistan and, especially, “Turkmenistan 
has been questioned by the international fi nancial institutions, even though it is expected 
that the two large oil- and gas-exporting economies, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
have grown much faster than the rest of Central Asia since 1999. Growth in these two 
economies has mostly been driven by high energy export prices, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and infrastructure investment” (Cukrowski 2006).
Kazakhstan’s decline in real GDP in the fi rst half of the 1990s was less than that in 
Kyrgyzstan, which may refl ect the less radical reforms in the country. However, Kazakhstan 
did not enjoy the growth Kyrgyzstan had in 1996–97. Kazakhstan was badly affected 
by the Russian crisis in 1998, and the drastic increase in commodity prices, although 
output growth did return in 2000. According to the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for the Asia Pacifi c (UNESCAP 2003), the GDP increased by over 11% a 
year on average in 2000–2001 due to the positive impact of continued institutional and 
banking reforms and strong infl ows of FDI. Strong economic performance was expected 
to continue in spite of the global downturn; in particular, GDP increased by 9.5% in 2002, 
compared with 2001 (UNESCAP 2003).
Figure 1. Comparative GDP performances, 1990–2002
Note: 1990 = 100. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2006.
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Figure 2. Growth in real GDP 1990–2005
Note: Data for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are generated from national 
offi cial statistics. Since 2001, these appear overstated. Alternative estimates 
place real annual GDP growth at around 8% for Turkmenistan and 1.5% or 
lower for Uzbekistan.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2006; ADB, 2006.
Similarly, GDP in Uzbekistan started to increase. By the mid-1990s the country managed 
to arrest the GDP decline, and it experienced modest economic growth during the second 
half of the 1990s and beyond. The relatively good performance can be explained by the 
increase in the world price of cotton and gold, the goods that Uzbekistan exports to the 
international market. In all six countries, aggregate output was increasing by the late 
1990s. In 2004, the regional GDP growth rate in Mongolia and Central Asia reached 
10.6% and 7%, respectively, which was above average compared with all transition 
economies. This growth has led the way to reduction in poverty in these countries noted 
by the World Bank (World Bank 2006).
GDP aggregates during 1990–2005 are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 3. The 
main features of the structural transformation during this period may be summarized as 
follows.
The share of agriculture in Mongolia rapidly increased from 15.2% in 1990 
to 43.8% in 1996 and then started to fall again, dropping to 21.7% in 2005. The rapid 
increase was mainly due to an increase in the number of livestock, and also the reduction 
in exports of meat and other animal products to the former Soviet Union. Kazakhstan 
experienced the highest decline in the share of agriculture in the GDP, from 34% to 6.5% 
in 2005. There has been a substantial decline in the production of grain, and in animal 
husbandry (with a sharp decline in the number of livestock). Agriculture faced a number 
of serious problems: a sharp fall in demand, competition from imported commodities 
(which were cheaper and of higher quality), a lack of working capital, and a small export 
market dominated by Russia. The other countries in Central Asia, where agriculture is 
the dominant sector of the economy, have experienced a smaller decline in the share of 
agriculture in the national income.
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Table 4. GDP aggregates, 1990–2005 (%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Kazakhstan 
Agriculture 34.0 29.5 23.1 16.4 14.9 12.3 12.1 11.4 8.6 9.9 8.1 8.7 8.0 7.9 7.1 6.5
Industry 32.6 36.3 39.5 37.0 38.7 30.0 25.6 25.6 29.3 33.0 37.8 34.3 35.8 35.1 35.4 37.6
Services 33.4 34.2 37.4 46.6 46.4 57.7 62.3 63.0 62.1 57.1 54.1 57.0 56.2 57.1 57.5 55.9
Kyrgyzstan
Agriculture 33.6 37.0 39.1 41.0 40.9 43.9 49.7 44.6 39.5 37.7 36.7 37.2 37.2 37.1 33.3 31.9
Industry 35.0 35.5 37.8 32.0 25.5 19.5 18.3 22.8 22.8 26.7 31.4 28.9 23.3 22.3 24.1 22.4
Services 31.4 27.6 23.1 27.0 33.7 36.6 32.0 32.6 37.7 35.6 31.9 33.8 39.5 40.6 42.6 45.7
Mongolia 
Agriculture 15.2 14.1 30.2 29.9 32.3 38.0 43.8 35.9 37.5 37.0 29.1 24.9 20.7 20.1 20.9 21.7
Industry 40.6 34.2 33.9 27.7 28.5 27.5 21.3 26.2 20.7 20.7 21.9 22.0 22.5 25.3 29.9 30.2
Services 44.2 51.7 35.9 42.3 39.3 34.5 34.9 37.9 41.8 42.3 49.0 53.1 56.8 54.6 49.2 48.1
Tajikistan
Agriculture 32.9 36.3 27.1 23.3 24.0 38.4 39.0 35.4 27.1 27.4 27.4 26.1 24.7 27.0 21.6 24.2
Industry 37.0 37.0 45.4 46.4 40.8 39.0 30.6 27.4 25.9 29.2 38.5 39.8 39.0 37.2 35.0 25.9
Services 30.1 26.7 27.6 30.4 35.3 22.6 30.4 37.2 47.0 43.4 34.1 34.1 36.4 35.7 43.5 49.8
Turkmenistan 
Agriculture 33.3 36.6 27.4 18.0 32.5 16.1 12.6 20.0 25.2 24.8 22.9 23.5 22.5 23.5 21.6 24.0
Industry 37.6 36.9 46.1 57.0 44.9 58.6 64.7 44.3 40.6 43.6 41.8 42.7 39.6 42.3 35.4 31.3
Services 29.1 26.4 26.5 25.0 22.6 25.3 22.7 35.7 34.3 31.5 35.2 33.7 37.9 34.2 43.0 44.8
Uzbekistan 
Agriculture 32.9 37.2 35.1 30.7 37.5 32.4 26.2 32.3 31.3 33.5 34.4 34.0 34.5 33.1 31.1 28.1
Industry 33.2 36.6 35.8 34.5 26.4 27.8 30.5 26.1 26.2 24.3 23.1 22.6 22.2 23.5 25.2 28.7
Services 33.5 26.2 29.1 34.8 36.0 39.8 43.3 41.6 42.5 42.2 42.5 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.7 43.2
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2006; ADB, 2006.
Aggregated data for Central Asia indicates that during the transition, the share of agriculture 
in GDP decreased slightly, while the services share throughout the period generally rose. 
Industry somehow retained its position, and fl uctuations in that sector of the market were 
smaller. The share of industry in Mongolia declined from 40.6% in 1990 to 21.3% in 
1996, rising again to 30.2% in 2005. The initial decrease in industrial production can be 
explained by the fact that many state-owned factories closed their doors due to insuffi cient 
fi nancing and management inexperience in dealing with the market. At the same time, the 
other Central Asian transition countries except Kazakhstan also suffered a decline in their 
share of industrial output.
The economic performance of a country is closely linked to its sectoral performance. 
For all the selected countries in this study except Kazakhstan, agricultural performance 
has mostly determined the pattern of economic development. In the agricultural sector 
for example, animal sub-sector performances played an important role in Mongolian 
economic development. Animal husbandry contributed more than 60% of agricultural 
sector output during 1990–1996, when the agricultural sector accounted for more than 
one-third of the GDP.
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Figure 3. GDP aggregates: Mongolia and Central Asia, 1990–2005 (%)
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Source: ADB 2006. 
On the other hand, the industrial sector experienced 20% growth during 2002. This growth 
increased the industrial sector’s share of GDP to 24.7%. The industrial sector grew by 
11.9%, driven by its main components, namely mining and manufacturing, which grew 
8.5% and 20%, respectively, and by construction, which expanded by 12.4%, refl ecting the 
incipient real estate boom in Ulaanbaatar. The service sector, accounting for 45% of GDP, 
registered 10% growth due to the positive state of wholesale and retail trade, fi nancial 
services development, and the transport and communications sectors (ADB 2002).
During this period, despite the growth of the industrial and service sectors, the 
agricultural sector’s share of GDP declined dramatically due to the winters and springs of 
1999–2002, which brought extreme climatic conditions (Consulate General of Mongolia 
in Singapore 2008). Massive numbers of livestock died in the droughts and snow falls 
that followed. In 1999, the total herd of 33.6 million heads of livestock declined to 26.1 
million in 2001, and 23.9 million by 2002 (Consulate General of Mongolia in Singapore 
2008). Consequently, agricultural production plummeted and economic growth slowed. 
However, real GDP grew from 1% in 2001 to 5.3% in 2003. This kind of economic 
growth was able to continue due to strong performances in the industrial and service 
sectors (Consulate General of Mongolia in Singapore 2008). 
In the fi rst half of the 1990s, all the newly independent states of the former USSR, 
including those in Central Asia, experienced a sharp decline. Between 1990 and 1995 the 
GDP fell by around 62% in Tajikistan, 49% in Kyrgyzstan, 39% in Kazakhstan, 30% in 
Turkmenistan and 18% in Uzbekistan. The decline in production was evident in every 
sector of the economy. During the same period, the output of agricultural goods fell by 
11%–55% in these countries, and the drop in industrial output in this region was even 
more severe. Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan suffered the highest falls of 68% and 67%, 
respectively. Only Uzbekistan was able to maintain industrial production in the mid-
1990s at the same level as in the previous fi ve years (Zhukov 2002: 334). The economic 
recovery started to appear in the mid-1990s in Central Asia, and by the beginning of the 
2000s most of the countries were in better shape.
In Kazakhstan, agricultural output declined substantially with great annual 
variation in the early 1990s. Industrial sector output also declined during the same period. 
Iron ore and coal output declined by more than half between 1991 and 1999. Natural 
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gas and electricity production also declined. However, while these declines were taking 
place, petroleum production increased substantially.
In the 2000s, both the industrial and agricultural sectors grew in terms of production. 
A good harvest of wheat for export helped the agricultural sector grow during this period. 
As noted by UNESCAP (2003), “Agricultural production grew by 3.0% in the beginning 
of 2000. Industrial output rose by almost 10% in Kazakhstan in 2002 as a result of rising 
oil and gas output.” Agricultural output, which dropped immediately after independence, 
increased overall in the late 1990s, however industrial production also experienced steep 
declines at the beginning of the transition and, with the exception of the mining sector, 
has not recovered. The decline in the industrial sector has pushed many people out of their 
technical and professional positions. Most of the movement has been towards the service 
sector, which grew continuously during the transition period.
Agriculture is the dominant sector of the Kyrgyz economy, accounting for about 
45% of GDP, half of the total employment, and 22% of exports in 1999. Agricultural 
production dropped in 1992, and then began to rise, although Kyrgyzstan showed a 
contraction in GDP at the beginning of the 2000s. “In fact, GDP declined marginally 
by 0.5% in 2002, largely due to a decline of more than 13% in industrial production. 
Economic growth was constrained by a slowdown in market-oriented reforms, industrial 
restructuring, and post-privatization reforms in the agricultural sector” (UNESCAP 
2003).
Figure 4. The growth trends of GDP components, 1991–2004 (%)
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Source: “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, 2006.
In Tajikistan, both the industrial and agricultural sectors experienced growth 
during the period from 1998 to 2003. The industrial sector benefi ted from the continued 
growth of the aluminum sector. The aluminum sector had previously accounted for up 
to 60% of industrial production and more than 50% of total export income. In terms of 
the agricultural sector, output increased by 10.6% during the same time period. Despite 
the economic growth in Tajikistan during this time, the country had low levels of capital 
investment and large defi cits in the external current accounts (UNESCAP 2003).
While agriculture is the largest employer in Turkmenistan, the country’s energy 
sector is the largest revenue earner. The Turkmenistan government began concealing 
production fi gures for natural gas and oil in 1997, however international organizations 
suggest that actual output levels for gas production and other forms of industrial production 
in the latter part of the 1990s were considerably below the 1991 pre-transition levels. 
The GDP of Turkmenistan increased by 16% in the beginning of 2000. The main factor 
of economic growth in Turkmenistan was hydrocarbons, which received a signifi cant 
infl ow of state and foreign investment. The agricultural sector met its production targets, 
resulting in record gains for these years, while the cotton crop declined due to poor weather 
conditions (UNESCAP 2003).
Uzbekistan experienced steady economic growth during the early 2000s. This 
growth was driven by industrial production, which was approximately 16% higher than 
the 1995 time period, and agricultural output, which rose by 7% in the same period. At 
the same time, the service sector grew the fastest at 12.7% in the fi rst half of 2002 (UNDP 
2003).
Savings and investments 
Domestic investment is a major contributor to the growth in output. If both Mongolia 
and the countries of Central Asia are to fulfi ll their growth targets for real GDP, they 
will need to maintain a substantial investment program. In Mongolia, the gross domestic 
investment as a proportion of GDP fell sharply in the immediate transition period. Prior 
to the transition, transfers from the USSR funded almost all investment, however these 
resources fell from 1989, and were eliminated in 1992. Investment stabilized in the early 
1990s at around 25% of GDP. However, a high proportion of this investment was funded 
from abroad, while internal sources of domestic investment were very small. The gross 
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domestic savings rate was probably under 20% of GDP, which meant that investment 
equivalent to between 5% and 10% of GDP had to be funded from abroad.
Figure 5. Gross domestic investments as proportion of GDP, 1992–2005 (%)
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Figure 6. Gross domestic savings as a proportion of GDP, 1992–2005 (%)
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Similarly, all the Central Asian countries experienced a decline in their gross domestic 
investment. In 1995, investment in Kazakhstan fell by 17% from the 1990 level. The 
level of capital accumulation was extremely low, and continued to fall. From the late 
1990s, Kazakhstan enjoyed greater investment, with a 12% increase in the annual rate of 
capital investment. Kyrgyzstan experienced an unstable rate of investment and savings. 
It experienced a sharp decline in investment the fi rst years of transition until 1995–1996, 
when the economy started to recover due to an increase in world prices for raw materials. 
The investment rate was high during this period, but then declined sharply again, until 
in 1998 investment amounted to around 30% of the level in 1990. The civil war, security 
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concerns, and the overall unstable political situation were the main reasons for a very low 
level of investment in Tajikistan (UNESCAP 2003). In Uzbekistan, a relatively low level 
of domestic savings during the period 1992–2000 contained the expansion of domestic 
investment. Realizing the limited capacity of the private sector to attract investment in 
the early years of transition, the Uzbekistan government aimed to maintain a relatively 
high rate of state investment. The share of state investment during the period 1995–2003 
fl uctuated between 23% and 30% of total investment, 95%–97% of which went to state-
owned enterprises.
Infl ation
Centrally planned economies suffer from suppressed infl ation and disguised 
unemployment. Under communism, prices are artifi cially set by central planners, rather 
than being determined by market forces of supply and demand. The sudden elimination 
of price controls caused dramatic rises in the cost of consumer goods as those goods 
moved to normal market prices; hence infl ation appeared out of control, achieving levels 
of 100%, 200%, or 300% a year. Eventually, this subsided.
For example, infl ation, which was almost nonexistent up until 1989, rose 
dramatically from 1991 to 1993 in Mongolia. The factors responsible for the price 
increases were the easing of price controls in 1991, the phased devaluation of the 
exchange rate, and the depreciation of the togrog due to the growth of an unoffi cial barter 
trade. There were shortages of food, clothing, and household goods, and these raised the 
prices of consumer goods. The infl ation rate of 121.2% in 1991 jumped to 321% in 1992 
before falling back to 49.3% in 1996. Prices continued their downward path in 1998. The 
consumer price index rose 6% during the calendar year of 1998, compared with 15% the 
previous year. According to the ADB, the infl ation rate “fell to 8.0% by [the] end of 2000, 
but accelerated again in the fi rst half of 2001 partly due to higher electricity tariffs and a 
decline in domestic meat supplies due to severe winter weather” (ADB 2001). Presently 
monetary policy in Mongolia is aimed at reducing infl ation to about 8% by the end of 
2008 (ADB 2001) (see Table 5).
During the transition period, hyperinfl ation took place all over Central Asia. In 
1994, Kazakhstan experienced the highest infl ation rate, although it stabilized in 1995. 
In 1995–1996, the expansion program delivered a good economic result. Kazakhstan’s 
trading position, however, weakened when the Asian crisis shook commodity prices, 
forcing the price of oil down by nearly 40%. Infl ation rose again in 1998, affected by the 
Russian fi nancial collapse. Kazakhstan’s high degree of dependence on oil, gas, and metal 
exports to Russia meant that the fi nancial crisis in Russia had an immediate impact on 
Kazakhstan’s economy.
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Table 5. Infl ation rate, 1990–2005 (%)
Mongolia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
1990 321 4 3 6 6 4
1991 183 91 85 100 103 91
1992 145 1610 855 574 2773 712
1993 268 1760 1209 1207 1292 1079
1994 88 1877 280 221 952 1239
1995 47 176 45 346 706 371
1996 37 39 32 431 1174 82
1997 9 17 23 65 62 66
1998 7 7 10 66 18 39
1999 12 8 37 27 23 44
2000 6 13 19 23 10 47
2001 1 8 7 30 12 45
2002 5 6 2 21 9 45
2003 8 6 3 28 6 27
2004 4 7 4 17 6 16
2005 9 8 4 10 21
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2006
In response, Kazakhstan’s government initially tightened fi scal policies in mid-1998 
and succeeded in reducing the infl ation rate to 8.5% a year later, and to around 6% in 
2002. Despite the government’s aim to bring infl ation down to 4%, the infl ation rate 
reached 8.4% in 2006 and 10.8% in 2008. In 2002, however, consumer prices went 
up by 5.9%, refl ecting rising wages, large-scale hard-currency infl ows and an amnesty 
for capital repatriation; the last two factors contributed to an expansion in the money 
supply, which served to fuel infl ation in 2002 (Gleason 2003: 45). In the period 1993–95, 
infl ation soared and was then brought under control in Kyrgyzstan. Like Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan also suffered from Asian fl u and the Russian fi nancial market collapse, and 
infl ation rebounded, reaching nearly 40% in 1999. A tight monetary policy and domestic 
currency stability contributed to relatively low rates of infl ation in Kyrgyzstan in the 
2000s. In 2002, for example, consumer prices only rose by between 1% and 3%. This was 
a remarkable achievement, given their high rates of infl ation in the late 1990s.
After 1991, Tajikistan’s economy went through several periods of high infl ation, 
caused by the civil war, huge budget defi cits, and monetary policies, with consumer prices 
increasing by 20%–50% per month in some periods. As a result, the fi nancial system of 
the country was devastated, and a large part of household savings was effectively wiped 
out. From the last quarter of 1997, budgetary and monetary discipline was restored with 
the help of the IMF and the World Bank, and domestic prices stabilized (Rosati 1999). 
At the end of 1998, the impact of the Russian crisis and the enforced devaluation of the 
Tajik ruble added some new infl ationary tendencies, but the restrictive fi nancial policies 
were maintained.
In Turkmenistan in 2003, high domestic fuel prices and a rise in public sector 
salaries produced a moderate increase in consumer prices. The government of Turkmenistan 
introduced rationing of basic goods and rice, butter, fl our, and sugar at subsidized prices, 
while restricting the exports of these commodities. Relatively stable domestic food prices 
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and government price controls have helped to keep infl ation at a relatively stable level of 
7%–9% in recent years. Consumer prices were expected to rise by 9% in 2002, a sharp 
decline from the level of 24% experienced in 1999 (Gleason 2003: 106).
Uzbekistan experienced high rates of infl ation for several years following the 
transition, however infl ation was on a downward trend by the middle of 2002, owing to a 
seasonal fall in food prices and an increase in the production of consumer goods. Higher 
pensions and public sector wages in Uzbekistan have, however, placed upward pressure 
on infl ation.
Foreign trade
Although Mongolia and the republics of Central Asia obtained their political independence, 
in 1991–92 they still depended heavily on trade with the CMEA countries and the Soviet 
Union.
In 1989, as much as 90.3% of Mongolia’s total exports were destined for CMEA 
countries, with 73.2% going to the USSR alone. Similarly, 92.5% of its imports were 
from CMEA countries, with the Soviet share as high as 82.7%. As for Central Asian 
countries, trade with the Soviet Union represented a high proportion of total trade 
(exports plus imports): 96% in Tajikistan, 91% in Kyrgyzstan, 89% in Kazakhstan, 85% 
in Uzbekistan, and 84% in Turkmenistan. This situation changed substantially during the 
transition period, with diversifi cation in both the destinations of Mongolia’s and Central 
Asia’s exports and the sources of their imports. By 1995, Mongolia had established trade 
relations with 56 countries. Goods were exported to 44 countries and imported from 53, 
and the customers for Mongolian exports had changed substantially from pre-transition 
days. Of the total, 15.2% went to Eastern Europe, 24.5% to Western Europe, and 54.1% to 
Asian countries. With respect to imports, 54.8% came from Russia and Eastern European 
countries, 26.8% from East Asia, and the remainder from Western Europe and the U.S. 
Capital goods accounted for 80% of imports, and consumer goods only 20%. In the export 
basket, copper still dominates, making up slightly more than half of total exports, while 
cashmere, wool, leather, meat, and related products contribute another 15%. It should be 
noted that fl uctuations in the prices of copper and cashmere on the world market have 
a major impact on export earnings of Mongolia. Gold exports, primarily from newly 
privatized mines, have also been increasing. Expanding gold exports improved the 
country’s terms of trade in 1997 and limited the overall defi cit to only $40 million, and in 
2006 the country experienced a budget surplus for the fi rst time since its transition. The 
Russian Federation is no longer a major importer of Mongolian goods, but China became 
an increasingly important trading partner during the transition period.
The collapse of the Soviet Union drove the Central Asian republics to seek access 
to world markets. This reorientation was even more necessary, since Central Asia could 
no longer rely on the delivery of critically important products from Russia and other 
former Soviet bloc countries.
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Table 6. Export and import shares of GDP, 1995–1998
Country Indicator 1992 1995 2000 2005
Mongolia Export as % of GDP 34.2 40.5 65.2 70.8
Import as % of GDP 41.8 48.5 82.0 75.1
Kazakhstan Export as % of GDP 74.0 39.0 56.6 53.5
Import as % of GDP 75.3 43.5 49.1 44.6
Kyrgyzstan Export as % of GDP 35.6 29.5 41.8 38.3
Import as % of GDP 47.6 42.4 47.6 56.8
Tajikistan Export as % of GDP 9.7 63.5 84.3 53.9
Import as % of GDP 12.5 68.2 86.3 72.8
Turkmenistan Export as % of GDP n/a 84.0 95.5 65.0
Import as % of GDP n/a 84.2 80.9 47.8
Uzbekistan Export as % of GDP 27.0 27.9 24.6 37.9
Import as % of GDP 43.2 28.1 21.5 28.7
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2006
Oil, natural gas, electric power, raw cotton and cotton fi ber, ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals, gold, and uranium make up more than four-fi fths of the region’s aggregate exports 
(Kamolov 2001). For Kazakhstan, in 1998, oil, gas, and metals accounted for 77% of 
national export revenues, and 83.1% of its market was outside the CIS. In Kyrgyzstan, 
gold accounted for 50% of exports, and more than 70% of all exports were to markets 
outside the CIS. Kyrgyzstan’s largest trading partner is Russia, which accounts for almost 
40% of their foreign trade. After Russia come the Ukraine, the US, Uzbekistan, Turkey, 
the UK, Germany, South Korea, and other countries. Thus, the Russian fi nancial crisis 
had a signifi cant impact on Kyrgyzstan, and total external trade declined by about 25% 
in 1999.
For Tajikistan for the same period, aluminum, electric power, and cotton accounted 
for 84.7% of total exports, and 91.8% of all exports were to markets outside the CIS. 
Tajikistan’s trade with the outside world was heavily affected by Uzbekistan government 
actions. When open confl ict broke out in Tajikistan in 1992, Uzbekistan set up border 
controls. The Dushanbe–Tashkent railway line was closed in August 1992 to passenger 
traffi c to prevent political refugees from moving out of Tajikistan. A short time afterwards, 
Uzbekistan closed the entire border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, completely cutting 
off Tajikistan from the outside world.
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Figure 7. Composition of exports, 2002 (%)
Source: ADB 2006.
In the early 1990s, Turkmenistan’s central government controlled its foreign trading 
partners, which were mostly the former republics of the Soviet Union, and it focused 
on exports of gas, fuel products, electricity, and cotton. Turkmenistan’s policy on cotton 
exports was similar to the policy of the other Central Asian countries. This policy was to 
raise the price of cotton for trading with their neighboring countries, while lowering the 
price of cotton on the world market. “Since 1991, Central Asian countries have more than 
doubled their exports of cotton to countries outside the CIS, accounting for 70% of West 
European cotton import” (Curtis 1996).
In terms of importing, during the 1990s, Turkmenistan’s main imports were food, 
light industrial products including textiles, and machinery. Similar to exporting, the main 
trading partners of Turkmenistan were still the former Soviet Union countries, with the 
exception of Finland, France, and Italy (Curtis 1996).
“Uzbekistan’s foreign trade results largely depend on international gold and 
cotton prices. The CIS countries contribute nearly one-third to foreign trade. Uzbekistan’s 
other principal trade partners are the U.S., South Korea, Germany, Japan, and Turkey. 
The country mainly imports capital goods, machinery and chemical products” (Egyptian 
Export Promotion Centre n.d). In Uzbekistan, cotton, gold, and uranium generated 76% 
of all exports and more than 90% of export revenue comes from markets outside the 
CIS. The de-industrialization of exports proceeded with particular speed in the largest 
states in Central Asia. Thus, in Kazakhstan, the proportion of machinery, equipment, and 
3%
7%
17.9%
2.8
%
21%
4%
8.6%
5.1%
－138－
vehicles in aggregate exports fell from 5.1% in 1996 to 2.2% in 1998. In Uzbekistan, the 
proportion of machinery, equipment, and vehicles in exports to countries outside the CIS 
dropped from 2.0% in 1996 to just 0.4% in 2002.
Foreign investment
Foreign factors are exerting a growing infl uence on the economic development of the 
Central Asian states, not only through trade, but also investment.
In Mongolia, prior to 1990, there was little to no private investment, with the 
majority of investment capital funded from the former USSR and allied countries. This 
fact changed in early 1990, with the passage of a variety of new legislation and trade 
agreements, all aimed at providing incentives for foreign investment in Mongolia. The 
year 1999 marked a turning point in moving Mongolia in a new direction, as it was 
granted normal trade relations status with the United States. As of July 2000, cumulative 
foreign investment in Mongolia reached $308.4 million, with more foreign investment 
expected in the future (Encyclopedia of Nations – Mongolia, online source).
In Kazakhstan, the government encouraged private, as well as foreign investment. 
In 1991, they adopted the Foreign Investment Law, which provided incentives for foreign 
investors, such as customs exemptions and security guarantees against law changes. “In 
1996, foreign direct investment was estimated at $1.22 billion, and at $1.3 billion in 1997. 
From 1993 to 2001, the total gross infl ow of FDI amounted to about $17 billion. Over 
a third (34% or $5.2 billion) of the FDI fl ow has come from the United States, with the 
United Kingdom as the second-largest source at $2.3 billion, or more than 15%. Other 
major sources of FDI are South Korea, China, Italy, Turkey, Japan, and Germany. As of 
October 2001, there were 3,606 joint ventures and 2,030 foreign companies operating in 
Kazakhstan” (Encyclopedia of Nations – Kazakhstan, online source).
Figure 8. Foreign direct investments, 1995–2002 (US$million, net)
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Source: Data for Mongolia, Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency of 
Mongolia (FIFTA) 2005; for Central Asian countries, EBRD 2003. 
In Kyrgyzstan, foreign direct investment increased at a slow but steady rate during the 
period from the early to mid 1990s. The government passed various legislation, which 
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promoted foreign investment in the country. A Foreign Investment Law was passed, which 
clarifi ed foreign investors’ rights, and established time frames for when foreign investment 
could occur. As a result of these actions, FDI increased, especially in the country’s most 
valuable industry – gold mining. The biggest investment came from Canada, Turkey, the 
US, and China (Encyclopedia of Nations – Kyrgyzstan, online source).
In Tajikistan, although the government promoted foreign investment, outside 
factors inhibited most outside investment in the country. Among other things, including an 
ongoing Civil War, currency convertibility problems, and a prohibition on land ownership, 
few investments fl owed into the country, with Russia providing most foreign investment 
(Encyclopedia of Nations – Tajikistan, online source).
A law on foreign investment and other legislation regarding private entrepreneurship 
passed since 1991 now provide most of the legal guarantees for foreign investors in 
Turkmenistan. In 1994, Turkmenistan’s laws were modifi ed to offer greater protection 
for the property and rights of foreign investors, and exemptions from duties and taxes for 
specifi c categories of investment. “Since 1991, Turkmenistan has received an estimated 
$2.86 billion in foreign direct investment” (EIU 2006) and for 2006 Turkmenistan 
expected to receive $308 million of FDI (EBRD 2006).
Unlike other countries, government intervention in Uzbekistan actually ended up 
discouraging foreign investment in the country. Although the economy seemed strong 
in the late 1990s, the government’s actions, coupled with the country’s lack of currency 
convertibility, reduced foreign investment to a low level. “By the end of 1992, 450 joint 
ventures were registered in the country but only 135 were actually operating” (Encyclopedia 
of Nations – Uzbekistan, online source). Despite the above setbacks, there were a few big 
investments in Uzbekistan. In 1994, British-American Tobacco, one of the world’s largest 
cigarette manufacturers, announced a $200 million deal to acquire a majority stake in 
the state-owned Uztobacco (Encyclopedia of Nations – Uzbekistan, online source). In 
1996, South Korea’s Daewoo Group announced a multi-billion dollar deal to build a 
telecommunications network in Uzbekistan. The company also invested $658 million 
to produce automobiles in Uzbekistan (Encyclopedia of Nations – Uzbekistan, online 
source).
Comparative social sector performances
The social costs of the rapid transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-
oriented economy in Mongolia and the Central Asian transition countries were very high. 
Basic social and human development services that had once been available either stopped 
functioning or became inaccessible to the majority of the population.
Unemployment
Unemployment is a relatively new phenomenon in Mongolia and Central Asian countries. 
With a centrally planned economy, Mongolia had not experienced unemployment before 
1989. After 1990, signifi cant levels of unemployment emerged. Real wages and the real 
value of pensions and social welfare benefi ts fell drastically. As a result, many families who 
had previously been secure fell below the poverty line. In 1994, the number of registered 
unemployed reached 76,000, or 8.5% of the economically active population. However 
it is estimated that only 20%–25% of Mongolia’s unemployed actually register with the 
government, and unoffi cial unemployment is also thought to be high. Underemployment 
is also a problem. In the 2000s, however, unemployment has been decreasing, due to the 
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rising number of jobs created by domestic and foreign investment.
With the move towards a market economy, the structure of employment has 
changed in Kazakhstan. The biggest decline in employment has been in the agricultural 
and industrial sectors, while self-employment and employment in the small service sector 
(mainly trading) has grown, and continues to grow. Kazakhstan experienced the highest 
unemployment rate among the six transition countries. The highest level of recorded 
unemployment was 292,800 (4.6% of the workforce) at the end of February 2000, 
up by 13.4% from 246,000 (3.6%) a year earlier, and like Mongolia, the true level of 
unemployment in Kazakhstan probably exceeded the offi cially recorded fi gure. In 1999, 
the average monthly wage was 10,984 tenge (US$91). The ADB (2003) observes: “Living 
standards improved as continuing economic growth helped to raise real incomes by 4% 
from the year earlier level. In 2002, average monthly wages reached T20305 (equivalent to 
US$131). However, regional income inequality remained, with wages in oil-rich regions 
double the country-wide average wage”.
In Kyrgyzstan, although the country experienced economic growth during the 
late 1990s, statistics show a steady increase in unemployment. “The unemployment rate 
increased from 1.7% of the labor force in 1993 to 5% in 2000” (ADB 2002). As the 
country moved into the new decade, some positive things did begin to take place. The 
incidence of poverty dropped, as a result of higher agricultural growth and stable food 
prices (ADB 2002).
As Tajikistan’s transition was unsuccessful, because of many internal factors, 
unemployment remained high, as expected. Although the offi cial statistics reported 
unemployment at just under 2%, the actual rate was estimated to be as high as 40%. 
As a result of the poor unemployment data, many well-educated Tajiks looked for job 
openings abroad due to better job availability and fi nancial benefi ts (Bureau of Economic, 
Energy and Business Affairs (BEEBA) 2009). “Estimates of the number of labor migrants 
working outside Tajikistan at any given time range from 500,000 to as high as one million” 
(BEEBA 2009).
Since Turkmenistan offi cially guarantees employment to every citizen, there is 
no offi cial unemployment in the country, and people registered as job seekers at labor 
exchanges are not formally considered unemployed. The number of such people remained 
unchanged at about 57,000 (2.6% of the labor force) in 2003. True unemployment is believed 
to be much higher, due to substantial hidden unemployment and under-reporting.
Figure 9. Unemployment annual growth rate (%)
Source: ADB 2006. 
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In Uzbekistan, the total number of unemployed as determined by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) has tended to decrease, and the level of unemployment is reported to 
be the lowest in Central Asia, as well as of all the transition countries. In 2003, 439,500 
people applied to job-placement bodies seeking jobs, a large decrease from 1995, and 
the number of offi cially registered unemployed in 2002 was 36,900, or 0.38% of the 
labor force. The offi cial unemployment rate continued to mask hidden unemployment, 
however, as it did not include those who were unregistered, and actual unemployment 
remains high, especially in poorer regions.
Poverty
Offi cial statistics indicated that poverty did not exist before Mongolia embarked on 
the transition to a market economy. However, poverty did indeed exist before and after 
the transition. After the transition, poverty was generated partly by external shocks and 
largely by the transition strategy as a consequence of the policies adopted to convert 
Mongolia from a centrally planned economy to a market economy (Griffi n 1998: 27). 
For the Central Asian countries, with their initial relatively high incidence of poverty, the 
consequence of lower average income and increased inequality has been high poverty 
rates (Pomfret and Anderson 2003: 28). In Mongolia, poverty increased substantially after 
1989, eventually reaching near-emergency levels, showing that poverty-stricken areas of 
the population were becoming worse off. This caused families to use up their remaining 
assets, further causing a breakdown in family and social support. “Defi ning poverty in 
terms of income, it has been estimated that in 1994, 26% of the total population (137,000 
households or 587,000 people) lived below the minimum standard of living set by the 
Mongolian government, and 6% belonged to the group classifi ed as very poor” (World 
Bank 1996).
Offi cial statistics for the Central Asian countries show that 46% and 34.6% of 
the population of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, respectively, were defi ned as poor (with 
a per capita monthly income of less than $45) in the mid-1990s. The estimates of the 
Kazakhstan State Statistical Committee in 1999 showed that about 15% of the population 
had incomes less than the national minimum level in 1989. This fi gure rose to 54% in 
1995, and to more than 80% in 1996.
Table 7. Poverty indicators, 2006
Country GINI index
Population without 
sustainable access to 
an improved water 
source
Population living 
below $1 a day
Population living 
below $2 a day
Population living 
below the national 
poverty line
1993–
2003 1990–2004 1990–2003 1990–2003 1990–2003
Kazakhstan 34.0 14 2.0 16.0 34.6
Turkmenistan 38.1 28 .. .. ..
Kyrgyzstan 41.5 23 2.0 21.6 47.6
Uzbekistan 46.8 18 .. .. 27.5
Mongolia 32.5 38 27.0 74.9 35.6
Tajikistan 32.6 41 4. 42.8 ..
Source: First column, “World Development Indicators,” World Bank 2006; 
columns 2–5, UNDP 2006. 
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In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the situation was hardly any better than in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan. In Tajikistan, by the late 1990s no less than 95% of the population was 
living in absolute poverty. In 1998, the average monthly wage was (according to offi cial 
exchange rates) US$128 in Kazakhstan, US$56 in Uzbekistan, US$51 in Mongolia, 
US$39 in Kyrgyzstan and less than US$8.80 in Tajikistan. At the end of 1998, the highest 
average monthly salaries in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan belonged to people working in 
the sectors of fi nance and banking, where they earned about US$40; the lowest belonged 
to those in education (US$6), health care (US$4), and agriculture (US$2.5). The low 
absolute level of income led to a consumption structure that was transparently primitive. In 
Kazakhstan, households spent 51% of their aggregate income on food; the corresponding 
indicators were 55% in Kyrgyzstan, 58% in Mongolia, 62%–63% in Turkmenistan, 69% 
in Uzbekistan and 87% in Tajikistan. According to the UNDP (2006), about 74.9% of the 
population of Mongolia subsisted on less than US$2 a day in 2003. In Uzbekistan, as of 
1997, half of the population lived below the offi cial poverty line, defi ned as the equivalent 
of less than US$0.75 per day.
Table 8. Selected social indicators
Country 
Bir ths  a t tended 
by skilled health 
personnel
O n e - y e a r -
o l d s  f u l l y 
immunized
Children 
under height for 
age
I n f a n t 
mortality rate
U n d e r - f i v e 
mortality rate
(%) (%) % (under age 5)
(per 1,000 
live births)
(per 1,000 
live births)
Kazakhstan 99 69 13 42 82
Kyrgyzstan 96 69 28 46 96
Mongolia 97 96 n/a 39 49
Tajikistan n/a 89 n/a 59 71
Turkmenistan 97 85 17 88 106
Uzbekistan 92 81 20 46 70
Low income 41 65 n/a 75 115
Lower  midd le 
income 85 85 13 31 40
Least-developed 
countries 36 72 35 93 148
Source: Data for Mongolia, Tajikistan and income levels, “World Development 
Indicators,” World Bank 2006; other countries, UNDP, 2005.
Although on average half the population was poor, 80% of the poor lived in rural areas. 
Evidence of the deterioration of the social situation also comes from such indicators as 
illness, child mortality, and life expectancy. A number of social indicators suggest that 
average living standards declined during the transition in Central Asia and Mongolia. 
Selected social indicators illustrate that the poverty level was highest in Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and data for these social indicators for these countries are 
close to the averages for low-income countries. Although Kazakhstan fell into the group 
of middle-income countries according to the World Bank classifi cation, these indicators 
also showed that income inequality remained a main problem there, since selected social 
indicators for Kazakhstan were much worse that for lower-middle-income countries.
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Mongolia has the lowest infant mortality rate and the highest rate for immunization 
among all six transition countries, though poverty is still one of the obstacles to economic 
growth with 35.6% of the total population still living below the poverty line.
Figure 10. Life expectancy (age), 1990–2005
60
64
68
72
1990 1992 1995 1997 2000 2002 2005
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Mongolia
Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Source: Data for Uzbekistan – Statistical Yearbook of Uzbekistan, State 
Committee on Statistics of Uzbekistan 2006; data for other countries – World 
Development Indicators, World Bank 2006. 
The data on life expectancy presented in Figure 8 also refl ects this pattern. During the 
period 1989–1999, life expectancy declined by over two years in Kyrgyzstan and by 
almost four years in Kazakhstan. Life expectancy at birth for these countries was below 
the European average but above some of the East Asian countries such as Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar. Life expectancy was declining for Tajikistan, while for other countries it had 
been increasing, except for some years in the mid-1990s. As of 2006, the life expectancy 
at birth for men in Mongolia was 62.8 years, which is higher than the Central Asian 
average of 61.6 years. As reported by the United Nations Development Program (2006), 
females in these countries live 5 years longer than males on average (UNDP 2006).
The Human Development Index (HDI) estimated by the UNDP is calculated based 
on three dimensions: “living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being 
educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels) and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, 
income)” (UNDP 2002).
The best ranking for human development for the six transition countries is 
Kazakhstan at 79, followed by Turkmenistan at 105, while Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Mongolia ranked at 110, 113 and 116 in the world, respectively. All the countries experienced 
high adult literacy rates, and ranked highly on that measurement. As mentioned earlier, 
all the countries except Kazakhstan are classifi ed as low-income countries by the World 
Bank, and the worst result was for Tajikistan, with a GDP per capita (based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) fi gures) of $1202 PPP. This ranked Tajikistan 122 out of 177 countries 
based on available data (Table 9).
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Table 9. Human development index
HDI value Life expectancy at birth(years)
Adult literacy rate (% ages 
15 and older)
Combined primary, secondary 
and tertiary gross enrolment GDP per capita (PPP US$)
Rank Value Country Rank Value Country Rank Value Country Rank Value Country Rank Value Country
1 0.965 Norway 1 82.2 Japan 1 100 Georgia 1 113.2 Australia 1 69961 Luxembourg
79 0.774 Kazakhstan 109 69.7 Uzbekistan 8 99.5 Kazakhstan 23 90.7 Kazakhstan 74 7440 Kazakhstan
105 0.724 Turkmenistan 112 67.1 Kyrgyzstan 9 99.5 Tajikistan 60 78.2 Kyrgyzstan 101 4584 Turkmenistan
110 0.705 Kyrgyzstan 116 64.5 Mongolia 15 98.8 Turkmenistan 61 77.3 Mongolia 130 2056 Mongolia
113 0.696 Uzbekistan 118 63.7 Tajikistan 17 98.7 Kyrgyzstan 80 73.8 Uzbekistan 138 1935 Kyrgyzstan
116 0.691 Mongolia 122 63.4 Kazakhstan 25 97.8 Mongolia 95 70.8 Tajikistan 141 1869 Uzbekistan
122 0.653 Tajikistan 128 62.5 Turkmenistan 128 19 Mali 172 21.5 Niger 152 1202 Tajikistan
177 0.311 Niger 177 31.3 Swaziland 172 561 Sierra Leone
Source: UNDP 2006. 
Conclusion
Mongolia and fi ve newly independent Central Asian states emerged from the Soviet bloc 
with similar economic systems and some similarity of economic structure. More than a 
decade later, their economic experiences are becoming very different from one another. 
The transition to a market economy in Mongolia has proved to be more diffi cult than 
originally planned. The poor economic performance can largely be explained by external 
shocks: the termination of Soviet aid, the return of macroeconomic advisors, the collapse 
of the Soviet trading bloc that consisted of the member countries of Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance and, partially, by the failure of the implementation of reform policies. 
There were also serious problems in the privatization program and in monetary reforms. 
Where a large volume of credit was created and there was poor allocation of credit among 
enterprises and poor fi scal policy, government current expenditure rose sharply, which 
resulted in a large, ineffi cient public sector.
Similarly, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan found it challenging to benefi t from the 
change to world prices instead of undervalued Soviet prices. The former Soviet states, 
their previous export destination of choice, were now less accessible, and their bargaining 
power was weak. The poorest countries in Central Asia have done less well, economically. 
Although Kyrgyzstan adopted rapid and basic reforms, the country had diffi culties in 
establishing a functional market economy. The impact of the rapid reform strategy was 
the severe decline in living standards, and the situation continued to worsen even when 
Kyrgyzstan began to experience positive economic growth. Tajikistan was the only 
country in Central Asia that experienced civil war, which badly affected its economic 
performance. Since 1997, when a peace agreement was reached, the government has 
adopted a reform strategy; however, implementation of this strategy continues to present 
many problems.
Uzbekistan, which was mostly characterized as a slow reformer, had the best 
economic performance, not only in Central Asia, but also of all the former USSR countries. 
Due to good governance, Uzbekistan experienced a lower rate of economic decline than 
the other countries in the early 1990s, and generated modest economic growth in the 
second half of the 1990s.
The common features of these six transition countries’ economic experience 
have been severe transformational recession during the fi rst half of the 1990s, followed 
by positive but slow growth since the late 1990s. In all six countries, governments had 
diffi culty in mobilizing resources and meeting expenditure demand, often for social 
expenditures. As in all former Soviet economies in transition from central planning, 
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inequality increased and, together with transformational recession, this created high levels 
of poverty in Central Asia and Mongolia.
Social indicators, which signaled great achievements during the era of the central 
planning system, worsened for all the selected countries. Unemployment increased 
substantially, particularly in rural areas, while many of the health-care services were 
removed from the list of services available to the public, despite the fact that health 
services were no longer free. The school enrollment ratio dropped everywhere in these 
countries, in both urban and rural areas, and the number of teachers was reduced, as many 
teachers moved to the private sector due to the low salaries available for teachers in the 
public system.
Obviously, initial conditions affected the success of the reforms; however, it is 
most likely that the reform strategy and the method of transition have played an important 
role in the success of these transition countries.
When will be transition be over?
Exactly when this type of transition will be completed is an area of controversy and is still 
being debated today. Just like in the case in which a recession is over, there is a disconnect 
between what economic theory provides as an answer and what economic reality suggests. 
As demonstrated in this study, in many instances the offi cial statistics are misleading. The 
answer to this question hinges on this concept. A number of distinguished economists 
have argued about this issue and their defi nitions of the outcome of transition are widely 
different.
As cited by Svejnar (2002), Kornai argued that “the end of transition is a situation 
in which the communist parties have lost monopoly political power, the private sector 
accounts for the majority of GDP, and the market is the dominant coordinator of the 
country’s economic activities.” All our selected countries embarked on a radical shift 
in political power and a structural change in the economy and thus, according to this 
defi nition, transition must have been over at least by the end of the 1990s or the early 
2000s (Brown 1999).
Unfortunately, the governments and citizens of these countries do not feel that they 
have completed their transition period, or that these countries’ economies are functioning 
as pure market economies. They believe that the transition is the process that will make 
them partners with the relatively advanced countries of the world.
As noted by Brown (1999) “Gelb (1999) sees the end of transition as a state when 
the problems and the policy issues confronted by … ‘transition countries’ resemble those 
faced by other countries at similar levels of development.” Such a defi nition is based on 
the economic development of the country, and therefore somehow comes close to reality 
(Brown 1999).
Personally, I believe that these countries are still in a transition period. The end 
of the transition only starts when these countries’ economies replace a central planning 
system with a market system. All institutions must adapt and fully embrace the changes 
brought about by the switch to a market system. It is here that these countries can then 
generate sustainable economic and social growth that makes them compatible with 
advanced market economies.
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